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_______________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
A jury convicted Marquis Wilson and Malcolm Moore of 
two counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy to rob banks, 
and two counts of using a firearm in the course of committing 
a crime of violence. They raise a host of challenges to their 
convictions and sentences. We find no error and will affirm on 
all fronts. In doing so, we hold that the Sixth Amendment does 
not categorically forbid stipulating to a crime’s jurisdictional 
element without the defendant’s consent or over the defend-
ant’s objection. Though contesting or conceding guilt is for 
criminal defendants to decide, their lawyers may decide 
whether to contest or concede a crime’s jurisdictional element. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Wilson’s and Moore’s convictions stem from two bank rob-
beries in November 2013. On November 4, three men robbed 
a Wells Fargo branch in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. The men 
entered the bank with what looked like a semiautomatic hand-
gun and took roughly $81,000. A bank employee named Calia 
Kane later admitted to assisting the robbers. 
The next morning, Wilson, Moore, and Martril Foster were 
pulled over while driving a rental car southbound on I-85 in 
North Carolina. After Wilson, the driver, said they were driv-
ing to Georgia and admitted that they had a lot of cash in the 
car, the officer suspected that the men were going to buy drugs 
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in Atlanta. He searched the car, found the stolen cash, seized 
it, and turned it over to federal drug agents. Afterward, the of-
ficer released the three men. 
About a week later, three men showed up at another Wells 
Fargo branch in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. But the bank was 
closed for Veterans Day, so the men tried again the next day. 
This time the bank was open, and the men got away with 
roughly $70,000. 
The police later got a tip from Lester Howell, a man whom 
Wilson had tried to recruit for the heists, about the first bank 
robbery. Howell gave the police a cell phone number of one of 
the robbers. The police traced that number to Wilson and 
pulled his cell-site location data, which put him at the scene of 
the Bala Cynwyd branch right before the first robbery. The data 
also showed five calls and seventeen text messages to and from 
Kane, the bank employee, that same day. And Howell identi-
fied Wilson and Moore from a video of the robbery. 
Because of the similarities in the two robberies, police sus-
pected that they involved the same perpetrators. Wilson, 
Moore, Foster, and Kane were charged for their roles in both. 
Kane and Foster took plea bargains and cooperated with the 
police.  
Wilson and Moore were tried jointly for two counts of bank 
robbery, conspiracy, and two counts of using a firearm in fur-
therance of a crime of violence. At trial, Wilson conceded that 
he had been one of the robbers and instead challenged whether 
the gun used was real. Moore maintained his innocence. Both 
men were convicted on all counts. The District Court sentenced 
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Moore to 385 months’ imprisonment, one month more than the 
mandatory-minimum sentence for his gun charges. Wilson re-
ceived 519 months, the top of his Sentencing Guidelines range.  
Both men now appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. COUNSEL’S STIPULATION THAT THE BANKS WERE 
FEDERALLY INSURED DID NOT VIOLATE THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT 
We start with the Sixth Amendment claim, as it is one of 
first impression in our Circuit. Wilson argues that his counsel 
violated his right to put on the defense of his choice by stipu-
lating that both Wells Fargo branches were federally insured. 
If a defendant robs a federally insured bank, that insurance 
gives prosecutors a jurisdictional hook to charge him with fed-
eral bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (f). So coun-
sel’s stipulation to this fact satisfied the jurisdictional element 
of federal bank robbery. Wilson says the stipulation was there-
fore “tantamount to a guilty plea.” Wilson Br. 37. Moore 
phrases the same argument differently, objecting that he was 
never advised of, and never consented to, his counsel’s stipu-
lation.  
We disagree. We hold that a defendant need not consent to 
a jurisdictional stipulation. Even if a lawyer stipulates to a 
crime’s jurisdictional element without getting his client’s con-
sent or over his client’s objection, that stipulation does not per 
se violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 
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A. Criminal defendants have the right to dictate the 
objectives of their defense and to make 
fundamental decisions 
When a criminal defendant challenges his counsel’s tactical 
choices, we usually analyze that challenge under the two-prong 
test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). But 
when a defendant is deprived of counsel entirely, the error is 
structural and the defendant gets a new trial. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–42 (1963). Likewise, when a 
defendant insists on representing himself, denying his right to 
do so is structural. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–
78 & n.8 (1984). So too is denying a defendant the right to re-
tain counsel of his choice. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). Thus, “[t]he Sixth Amendment does 
not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the ac-
cused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his 
defense.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).  
The Sixth Amendment respects a defendant’s right to coun-
sel and right to autonomy by dividing ultimate decisionmaking 
authority between lawyer and defendant. Lawyers control tac-
tics, while defendants get to set big-picture objectives. For tac-
tical decisions, like which arguments to press and what objec-
tions to raise, the lawyer calls the shots. See Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242, 248–49 (2008) (citing New York v. Hill, 
528 U.S. 110, 114–15 (2000)). But fundamental decisions be-
long to the defendant alone: whether to plead guilty, waive a 
jury trial, testify, or appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983).  
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Recently, in McCoy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court clari-
fied the line between tactical and fundamental decisions. See 
138 S. Ct. 1500, 1507–08 (2018). On the one hand, “strategic 
choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives” are de-
cisions for lawyers, so we review them for ineffectiveness. Id. 
at 1508. On the other hand, “choices about what the client’s 
objectives in fact are” belong to defendants themselves, and 
violating a defendant’s right to make those choices is structural 
error. Id. 
In McCoy, the defendant was charged with murdering three 
relatives of his estranged wife and faced a possible death sen-
tence. 138 S. Ct. at 1505–06. His counsel wanted to concede 
guilt and argue for mercy at sentencing. Id. at 1506 & n.2. But 
the defendant insisted on contesting guilt; he demanded that 
counsel instead advance a conspiracy theory that he was being 
framed by crooked state and federal officials. See id. at 1513 
(Alito, J., dissenting). Counsel ignored that demand and con-
ceded before the jury that McCoy had killed the victims. Id. at 
1506–07 (majority opinion). 
The Supreme Court vacated McCoy’s convictions. The 
Sixth Amendment, it held, guarantees defendants the “[a]uton-
omy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert in-
nocence.” 138 S. Ct. at 1508. Violation of that right is struc-
tural error. Id. at 1511. The Court observed that a defendant 
“may wish to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium that comes 
with admitting he killed family members.” Id. at 1508. So 
“[w]hen a client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his de-
fence’ is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, 
his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override 
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it by conceding guilt.” Id. at 1509 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. 
VI). Yet the Court did not explain what kinds of concessions 
count as “conceding guilt.” That is the issue here. 
B. Whether to contest a crime’s jurisdictional element 
is not a fundamental decision reserved for the 
defendant 
Wilson argues that under McCoy, his counsel’s stipulation 
to the jurisdictional element violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights. But this case is different from McCoy. For one, counsel 
did not override his client’s expressed wishes. There is no evi-
dence that either defendant objected to the stipulation or de-
manded that counsel not concede this element of the crime. 
Appellants argue only that counsel should have consulted with 
them or that the District Court should have advised them about 
it. True, the stipulation was in some sense contrary to Wilson’s 
asserted “objective . . . to contest the charges against him” gen-
erally, and to Moore’s decision to challenge his guilt “in all 
respects.” Wilson Br. 37; Moore Br. 39. But neither can show 
that he “expressly assert[ed],” and that counsel ignored, a spe-
cific demand to fight the jurisdictional element. McCoy, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1509.  
Even if appellants had instructed counsel to fight the juris-
dictional element, two more basic factors would distinguish 
McCoy. First, that case was about conceding factual guilt: 
McCoy claimed that he had not killed the victims. While main-
taining one’s innocence or trying to minimize punishment is a 
fundamental objective of the defense, litigating the jurisdic-
tional element is but a technical, tactical means to achieve that 
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objective. Second, jurisdictional elements trigger no “oppro-
brium” or stigma. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508. In fact, they typ-
ically have nothing to do with the defendant. Whether the 
Wells Fargo branches were federally insured is quite separate 
from Wilson’s or Moore’s conduct, mental states, or involve-
ment in the robberies. So conceding the jurisdictional element 
cast no stigma upon them. 
In sum, whether to contest or concede a jurisdictional ele-
ment is a tactical decision reserved for counsel, not defendants. 
This is why McCoy distinguished counsel’s concession of fac-
tual guilt from a “strategic” decision “to concede an element of 
a charged offense.” 138 S. Ct. at 1510. Here, counsel made the 
latter choice. And by conceding jurisdiction, counsel has not 
“entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaning-
ful adversarial testing.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
659 (1984). Of course, counsel always retains the ethical re-
sponsibility to consult with the defendant about how to achieve 
the defendant’s goals. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
r. 1.4(a)(2). But failure to consult with the defendant on the 
stipulation or to heed his instruction to contest a jurisdictional 
element, while perhaps ethically worrisome, is not structural 
error. We express no view about whether counsel’s decision 
here met Strickland’s two-part test for effective assistance of 
counsel. 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS FAIL 
Next, we turn to a pair of suppression claims, both of which 
fail. 
A. The traffic stop did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment 
Wilson and Moore sought to suppress the evidence seized 
from their rental car in North Carolina. Moore argues that the 
initial stop was improper. And both claim that the police officer 
impermissibly extended the stop before he found the evidence. 
The District Court denied their motions to suppress. We agree 
and will affirm that ruling. 
We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear er-
ror and its application of law to those facts de novo. United 
States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). Our review 
of the facts is aided by the dashcam video from Officer Joshua 
Freeman’s patrol car, which is in the record and lasts the dura-
tion of the traffic stop.  
1. There was reasonable suspicion to support the traffic 
stop. Moore first argues that any evidence from the traffic stop 
should have been suppressed because the stop was pretextual 
and not supported by probable cause. But traffic stops require 
only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. United States v. 
Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2012). And pretext is irrele-
vant: “[T]he Supreme Court [has] established a bright-line rule 
that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, 
even if the stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some 
other crime.” Mosley, 454 F.3d at 252 (citing Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 
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Officer Freeman had reasonable suspicion that the driver 
had broken traffic laws. He testified at the suppression hearing 
that he saw the car speeding, changing lanes without signaling, 
and tailgating the car in front of it. The District Court credited 
this testimony. And we can see the tailgating violation for our-
selves on the video. All of these violate North Carolina traffic 
law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-141(a)–(b), (d); 20-152(a), 20-
154(a), (b). So there was reasonable suspicion to justify the 
stop. 
2. Officer Freeman did not impermissibly prolong the stop. 
A traffic stop may last as long as needed to “to address the traf-
fic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety 
concerns.” United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 409–10 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
1609, 1614 (2015)). Beyond that point, the officer must have 
reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and investigate fur-
ther. Id. at 410. Here, the officer did. 
Within minutes, Officer Freeman learned suspicious facts 
that gave him cause to investigate further. When he first pulled 
the car over and asked Wilson for his license and registration, 
Wilson explained that it was a rental car. Freeman asked Wil-
son to get out of the car. While Wilson was exiting, Freeman 
peered through the hatchback into the trunk area and noticed 
that there was no luggage.  
The rest of Officer Freeman and Wilson’s conversation 
took place in the front of Freeman’s cruiser. Freeman ex-
plained the traffic violations that he had witnessed. Wilson 
then volunteered that he was driving from Philadelphia to 
Georgia for his uncle’s funeral, that he was tired, and that he 
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planned to stay for a week. During this exchange, Freeman kept 
communicating with dispatch while checking Wilson’s license 
and the rental-car information. He learned that Wilson’s name 
was not on the rental agreement and that the day before, the car 
had been rented for one month. This all happened within about 
four minutes. 
Officer Freeman then went to talk with Moore and Foster, 
who were still in the rental car. They said they had been trav-
eling all night to Atlanta to see their brother and that they 
planned to stay for a week, but said nothing about a funeral. 
When Freeman asked why they had no luggage, they answered 
that they would just buy what they needed in Georgia. Freeman 
asked Wilson the same question and got the same answer. Wil-
son also admitted that he had a juvenile drug arrest. 
Next, Officer Freeman confronted Wilson with his suspi-
cions that Wilson and his passengers were lying about the real 
reason for their trip. Freeman told Wilson that he did not buy 
his story about his uncle’s funeral. And he asked how much 
cash was in the car. Wilson hesitated before finally admitting 
that he thought there was roughly $20,000. 
We can hit pause on the story right there. At this point, less 
than ten minutes had elapsed since Officer Freeman had pulled 
over Wilson’s car. As Freeman had not heard back from dis-
patch with information about Wilson and the rental car, the 
stop was still justified for traffic enforcement. See Rodriguez, 
135 S. Ct. at 1614–15. By then, Freeman had learned more than 
enough to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
three men were trafficking drugs: They were driving through 
North Carolina in a rental car they had picked up the day before 
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in Philadelphia, but the person named in the rental agreement 
was not in the car. They said they were going to Georgia for a 
week, but the car was rented for a month and they had no lug-
gage. They gave conflicting stories about their trip’s purpose. 
And Wilson confessed to having a lot of cash in the car. Espe-
cially given Freeman’s extensive experience interdicting 
drugs, his suspicion was objectively reasonable. See United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002). Thus, by the 
time Freeman extended the stop to investigate other crimes, he 
had more than enough evidence “to establish reasonable suspi-
cion that [the passengers] w[ere] involved in drug trafficking.” 
United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (cit-
ing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615).  
3. Wilson and Moore forfeited the argument that Wilson’s 
consent was invalid. After Officer Freeman gave Wilson a 
written warning, Wilson consented to a search of the rental car. 
Only then did Freeman discover the stolen cash. In the District 
Court, Wilson and Moore challenged the voluntariness of that 
consent, but the court found that it was voluntary. On appeal, 
Wilson and Moore allude to this issue in passing but do not 
press it. Thus, they have forfeited this issue. So we need not 
decide whether Wilson’s consent was valid. See, e.g., Sikirica 
v. Wettach (In re Wettach), 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(appellants forfeited an argument by “fail[ing] to develop” it 
before the court of appeals). 
B. Use of the cell-site location data was proper under 
the good-faith exception 
Wilson and Moore also argue that, at trial, the Government 
improperly introduced cell-site location information about 
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Wilson’s cell phone. In 2014, the Government got a court order 
compelling production of that data under a statute that did not 
require a search warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). At the time, 
our precedent approved of this practice, permitting cell-site or-
ders without probable cause. See In re Application of the U.S. 
for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 
2010). Years later, the Supreme Court abrogated that prece-
dent, holding that these cell-site searches require a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206, 2217–21 (2018). So Wilson and Moore argue that 
Wilson’s cell-site location information should have been sup-
pressed. 
Not so. After Wilson and Moore filed their briefs, we held 
that cell-site location information gathered under § 2703(d) be-
fore Carpenter is protected by the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 
204 (3d Cir. 2019). Relying on a § 2703(d) order was objec-
tively reasonable at the time. Id. And there is no claim that the 
Government violated the procedures required by § 2703(d). Id. 
So the evidence was admissible. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
DISCRETIONARY TRIAL-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 
Next, Moore challenges the District Court’s failure to sever 
the two codefendants’ joint trial as well as its failure to grant a 
mistrial after a witness mentioned that Wilson and Moore had 
a history of drug dealing. These discretionary decisions were 
both proper. 
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A. The District Court did not commit plain error by 
failing to sever the trial 
In a move that Moore calls “[u]nexpected[ ]” and a “sur-
prise,” Wilson’s counsel conceded at trial that Wilson had in 
fact robbed both banks. Moore Br. 48–49. By contrast, 
Moore’s trial strategy was to deny any involvement. Wilson’s 
concession undermined that strategy by bolstering the testi-
mony of cooperators whom Moore needed to discredit. So 
Moore argues that the District Court should have severed the 
two defendants’ trials right then and there.  
Moore’s burden is extremely heavy. Because he did not ask 
for a severance at the time, we review the District Court’s fail-
ure to do so sua sponte for plain error. United States v. Hart, 
273 F.3d 363, 369–70 (3d Cir. 2001). And plain-error review 
or not, “[i]t is not enough to show that severance would have 
increased the defendant’s chances of acquittal.” United States 
v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992). A defendant 
must always “pinpoint ‘clear and substantial prejudice’ ” aris-
ing from the failure to sever and “resulting in an unfair trial.” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).  
Moore cannot carry this burden. The risk of prejudice here 
was weaker than in a case in which codefendants present mu-
tually antagonistic defenses: Wilson conceded his own in-
volvement, but the jury could still have found insufficient evi-
dence that Moore was involved with him. And severance is 
strong medicine. Even in a case of antagonistic defenses, sev-
erance is not automatically required. See Zafiro v. United 
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States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993). Instead, we “leave[ ] the tai-
loring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s 
sound discretion.” Id. at 538–39.  
The District Court exercised that discretion here. It re-
minded the jury that counsel’s statements were not evidence 
and that the jury would have to decide each defendant’s guilt 
individually. “We presume that the jury follows such instruc-
tions, and regard such instructions as persuasive evidence that 
refusals to sever did not prejudice the defendant.” United 
States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 776 (3d Cir. 2005)). That 
presumption is a strong one, and Moore points to nothing spe-
cial here to overcome it. 
B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying a mistrial after a witness mentioned Wilson 
and Moore’s drug dealing 
Moore also argues that the District Court should have 
granted a mistrial after a witness unexpectedly mentioned his 
history of drug dealing. According to the prosecution, it had 
warned Foster, one of the cooperating coconspirators, not to 
mention Wilson and Moore’s history of dealing drugs. Yet 
when asked how he knew Wilson and Moore, Foster testified 
that “we used to sell drugs together.” Wilson App. 1218. The 
defense immediately moved for a mistrial, which the District 
Court denied. We review that denial for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 131 n.153 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Witnesses often let slip improper evidence. Usually, the so-
lution is a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard what 
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it should not have heard. We presume that the jury will follow 
this instruction, unless we see an “ ‘overwhelming probabil-
ity’ ” that it will not and “a strong likelihood” that the improper 
evidence “would be ‘devastating’ to the defendant.” United 
States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 198 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
Here, the District Court gave a curative instruction 
promptly. It told the jury to “[d]isregard the comment about 
selling drugs,” clarified that the trial was about bank robberies 
and guns rather than drugs, and warned the jury that “we’re not 
going to either determine or be distracted by anything else.” 
Wilson App. 1218–19. The court also clarified that Foster’s 
statement “has no evidentiary value.” Wilson App. 1219. 
Nor is this the sort of inadvertent slip that would irrevoca-
bly taint the jury. Foster said nothing about robbing banks or 
using guns. Drug dealing is unrelated to bank robbing and has 
only an indirect connection to gun toting. Given the immediate 
and clear curative instruction, this isolated comment would not 
have been “devastating.” Gonzalez, 905 F.3d at 198 (quoting 
Newby, 11 F.3d at 1147). So the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by denying a mistrial. 
V. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT MAKE IMPROPER  
STATEMENTS AT TRIAL 
Moore also challenges three of the prosecutor’s statements 
in his closing argument. These challenges fail too. 
Moore argues that in the prosecutor’s closing arguments, he 
vouched for the prosecution’s own credibility and the credibil-
ity of its witnesses. To show improper vouching, the defendant 
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must prove that the prosecutor did two things: first, that he “as-
sure[d] the jury that the testimony of a government witness is 
credible,” and second, that he explicitly or implicitly “base[d] 
his assurance on either his claimed personal knowledge or 
other information not contained in the record.” United States v. 
Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). A defendant must show 
that a comment refers, explicitly or implicitly, to “the prosecu-
tor’s [own] personal knowledge” or to “other information not 
contained in the [trial] record.” United States v. Walker, 155 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Three statements are at issue. Because Moore objected to 
the first of these statements, we review the District Court’s de-
cision to allow that statement for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). But because 
he did not object to the other two statements, we review those 
for plain error. United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d 
Cir. 2006). In context, none of the three challenged statements 
was improper.  
First, the prosecutor argued that even though cooperators 
like Kane and Foster “have a motive to lie, . . . [w]e take neces-
sary precautions to ensure that if anybody’s going to get on that 
stand and testify, they better darn well be telling the truth.” 
Wilson App. 1441–42. The District Court overruled Wilson’s 
objection. The prosecution immediately clarified to the jury: 
“It’s the plea agreement that I’m referring to . . . . They’re terms 
that [Kane and Foster are] bound by. The only way that they 
could help themselves here, ladies and gentlemen, is by telling 
the truth. That’s their only hope.” Wilson App. 1442.  
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Kane’s and Foster’s plea agreements had been introduced 
into evidence. So in context, the prosecutor was not suggesting 
that he knew something the jury did not. He was arguing that 
the jury should conclude from the plea agreements that Kane 
and Foster had everything to lose and nothing to gain by lying. 
So the District Court did not abuse its discretion in letting the 
prosecutor make this argument. See United States v. Saada, 
212 F.3d 210, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Soon after that, the prosecution added a second statement: 
“The defense would have you believe that [Kane and Foster 
are] not credible because they would come in here and lie just 
to try and get a reduced sentence. In order for you to believe 
that, ladies and gentlemen, you have to believe that we are a 
bunch of idiots.” Wilson App. 1444. That statement was unfor-
tunate, but he immediately continued: “If you want to believe 
that, that’s up to you, but nothing that you’ve seen in this court-
room would lead you to that conclusion.” Id. Allowing that 
statement was not error, let alone plain error. The prosecution 
was merely commenting on the weakness of the defense’s the-
ory that Kane and Foster were lying. And the prosecutor ex-
plicitly said it was up to the jury to decide who was telling the 
truth, based on what “you’ve seen in this courtroom.” Id. 
The same goes for the third statement, which the prosecutor 
made in rebuttal. He said he was “surprised to hear” the de-
fense’s theory that “we’re somehow complicit in this plan to 
turn the tables on these two guys and have you find them guilty 
when they’re—at least Moore, when he’s really not.” Wilson 
App. 1500. After mentioning four agents who investigated the 
robbery and testified, the prosecutor asked: “Do you think we 
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all put blinders on and, when we saw the information provided 
by Kane and Foster when they first talked to police and . . . there 
was no gun mentioned,” that the prosecution “wanted there to 
be a gun so bad that we got them to change their story and 
didn’t let them plead guilty until they told us it was a gun? Do 
you believe that for a minute, ladies and gentlemen? You have 
no reason to believe that.” Wilson App. 1500–01.  
In context, the prosecutor was commenting on what the jury 
would have to believe to accept the defense’s theory: that sev-
eral Government witnesses were lying and that the Govern-
ment had coerced Kane and Foster to lie about a gun. The pros-
ecution had the right to argue that the jury “ha[d] no reason to 
believe that” theory because, in its view, there was simply no 
evidence in the record to support the defense’s theory. Wilson 
App. 1501. So the District Court’s decision to allow these 
statements was not error, let alone plain error.  
VI. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
CONVICTIONS 
Next, both Wilson and Moore challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence that the bank branches were federally insured. 
Moore makes two additional arguments: He challenges the ev-
idence of his involvement in the conspiracy and the robberies. 
He also challenges the evidence that the gun used in the rob-
beries was real. 
Our review is highly deferential. We cannot disturb the 
jury’s factual findings if, “after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979). On this record, all three challenges fail. 
A. The stipulation established the jurisdictional element 
Appellants’ first challenge is groundless. The Government 
introduced a certificate evidencing the federal insurance of 
“Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,” the national parent company cov-
ering all the branches. Wilson App. 1651. And both defend-
ants’ counsel stipulated that both branches were federally in-
sured. A stipulation can establish an element of a crime. See 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) (citing 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)). 
Appellants fall back on objecting that the stipulation was 
not in writing, that they were never advised on it by counsel or 
the District Court, and that they did not understand what was 
going on. But these objections say nothing about whether there 
was enough evidence. There was. The most we can make of 
this argument is a rehash of the Sixth Amendment claim. And 
as we explained above, whether to stipulate to a jurisdictional 
element is a tactical decision left to counsel’s professional 
judgment. 
B. There was sufficient evidence that Moore was  
involved in the crimes 
Moore next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that 
he took part in the robberies. He highlights the lack of physical 
evidence and the Government’s reliance on cooperators’ testi-
mony. And he notes evidence that all three robbers were about 
the same height, while Wilson and Foster are six to nine inches 
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taller than he is. He also claims that there was too little evi-
dence that he was involved in planning the robberies to support 
the conspiracy charge.  
But there was plenty of evidence that Moore was involved 
in all the crimes: Kane testified that Moore took part in plan-
ning discussions before the robberies. Kane and Foster both 
testified that Moore went into the banks carrying a gun. And 
both testified that Moore had helped pick the target of the sec-
ond robbery. Moore argued to the jury that Kane and Foster 
were lying about his role in the robberies. But the jury could 
and did reject that argument. And if the jury believed Kane and 
Foster, it was justified in finding that Moore was part of the 
conspiracy. 
We likewise reject Moore’s argument about the height of 
the robbers. While some evidence suggested that the robbers’ 
heights were similar, other witnesses reported that one robber 
was “short and stocky” and that the one who held the gun was 
“[m]edium-size[d].” Wilson App. 540–41, 672–73. It is not our 
job to reconcile that conflicting evidence when reviewing a 
cold trial record. That was for the jury. 
C. There was sufficient evidence of a real gun 
Moore also challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) for using a gun during the bank robberies. He claims 
that the Government never proved that the gun was real, as op-
posed to a BB gun he owned and used as a prop in music vid-
eos. We disagree. 
Several eyewitnesses in the banks testified about the gun, 
including one who had lifelong experience with guns. The two 
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cooperating witnesses corroborated this: Kane testified that 
Wilson and Moore called the gun “the .40.” Wilson App. 895–
96. And Foster testified that before the robberies, Wilson 
showed him a loaded “standard-issue Glock.” Wilson App. 
1231–32. Based on a video of the robbery, one agent concurred 
that the gun was a Glock .40 caliber, the same gun that he car-
ried on duty. Another agent agreed. This testimony was more 
than enough evidence for a rational jury to find that the gun 
was real. See United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 572–73 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
VII. BANK ROBBERY WAS PROPERLY CHARGED AND  
INSTRUCTED AS A “CRIME OF VIOLENCE” UNDER  
18 U.S.C. § 924(C) 
Wilson and Moore were each convicted of two counts of 
brandishing a gun “during and in relation to” a “crime of vio-
lence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). They argue that their 
crimes are not crimes of violence under that statute, and that 
the jury instructions on those counts were improper. The first 
objection is a nonstarter. We have recently held that armed 
bank robbery is categorically a crime of violence under 
§ 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. United States v. Johnson, 899 
F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Wilson and Moore’s challenge to the jury instruction like-
wise fails. They argue that the District Court should not have 
instructed the jury that conspiracy (or perhaps conspiracy to 
commit bank robbery) counts as a crime of violence. But even 
if that is right, it gets them nowhere. The District Court in-
structed the jury that either conspiracy or armed bank robbery 
would count as a predicate crime for a § 924(c) conviction, as 
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long as the jury found that the defendants had used or carried 
the gun to further the crime. Wilson App. 1546. The jury con-
victed both defendants on both bank-robbery counts. So we can 
tell from the verdict form, as well as from the evidence pre-
sented at trial, that there is no “reasonable possibility” that the 
jury based its § 924(c) convictions only on the conspiracy as 
opposed to the bank-robbery counts. See United States v. Duka, 
671 F.3d 329, 356 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, even if the instruction 
was erroneous, any error was harmless. See United States v. 
Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2011). 
VIII. THE SENTENCES WERE PROPER 
Finally, both Wilson and Moore argue that they should get 
the benefit of the recent First Step Act, which would lower their 
mandatory-minimum sentences. Wilson also argues that his 
prison sentence was substantively unreasonable. Neither argu-
ment succeeds. 
A. The First Step Act’s change to § 924(c) is not 
retroactive to defendants sentenced before the Act 
was passed 
Wilson and Moore argue that they should benefit from the 
First Step Act because their cases were still pending on direct 
appeal when it was enacted. Thus, they claim, their sentence 
had not really been “imposed” within the meaning of section 
403(b) of the First Step Act. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. 
L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. But while this appeal 
was pending, we held that a defendant whom a district court 
had sentenced before the First Step Act was enacted could not 
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retroactively claim the benefit of section 403(b). United States 
v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162–64 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Wilson and Moore also advance a new argument that we 
did not address in Hodge: that by titling section 403’s amend-
ment a “[c]larification,” Congress was suggesting that it was 
simply conforming the text of § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) to what the 
statute was supposed to have meant all along. But whatever the 
merits of these arguments, as a later panel we are bound by 
Hodge’s reading of section 403. See Reilly v. City of Harris-
burg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017). So we must reject the 
First Step Act argument. 
B. Wilson’s sentence was substantively reasonable 
The District Court sentenced Wilson to 519 months’ im-
prisonment (43 years and three months), at the top of his Sen-
tencing Guidelines range. Wilson does not challenge the pro-
cedures the District Court followed, but claims that sentence 
was substantively unreasonable. He did ask for a lower sen-
tence, right above the 32-year mandatory minimum, so he has 
preserved that claim. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 
140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020). We review the sentence for abuse 
of discretion. United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 
151 (3d Cir. 2017). That means “we will affirm it unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sen-
tence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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Wilson explains that even a 32-year sentence would keep 
him in prison until he was in his fifties. He argues that impris-
oning him longer serves no valid purpose and that we should 
not defer to a Guidelines range where, as here, it is pegged to 
a mandatory minimum. But the District Court considered the 
requisite statutory sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a). In particular, it focused on general and specific de-
terrence and retribution, factoring in the crimes’ effect on the 
victims and Wilson’s recruiting of other participants. The 
Court did not defer blindly to the Guidelines; indeed, it consid-
ered both upward and downward departures. In the end, it 
chose the top of the Guidelines range. That decision was rea-
sonable. 
* * * * * 
Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 
choose the ultimate objectives of their defense. That includes 
the right to maintain their factual innocence, even if their law-
yers advise them to admit guilt. But their lawyers call the shots 
on the tactics used to achieve those objectives. Defense law-
yers may thus stipulate to the jurisdictional elements of crimes 
without their clients’ consent or over their clients’ objection. 
Because counsels’ stipulations did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment, and because Wilson’s and Moore’s other argu-
ments fail, we will affirm their convictions and sentences. 
